摘要
使用2000—2014年我国上市银行的样本数据,实证检验银行高管薪酬对银行风险承担及绩效的影响。银行高管薪酬与银行违约距离风险(DD)呈显著的倒U型关系,与银行资产收益率(ROA)也呈显著的倒U型关系。进一步的稳定性检验(使用不同的风险和绩效指标)同样证实,银行高管薪酬与银行风险承担及绩效都呈稳定的显著倒U型关系:当银行高管薪酬达到448万元时,银行绩效由上升趋势转为下降趋势;当银行高管薪酬达到594万元时,银行风险承担水平由上升趋势转为下降趋势。从目前银行高管薪酬的平均水平(225.4万元)来看,我国银行绩效与风险承担正处在随高管薪酬增加而不断上升的阶段。因此,当银行高管薪酬达到临界值(约为448万元和594万元)时,需格外关注银行的风险承担行为和绩效水平。
The paper uses the sample of Chinese listed Banks in 2000-2014 data to empirically test the executive pay effects on bank risk taking and performance. Empirical research shows that the level of executive pay presents an inverted U type with the risk of bank default distance( DD); executive pay level and bank return on assets( ROA) also showed a significant inverted-U relations. Further stability tests( using different risk and performance indicators) also confirmed that the relation between the level of executive pay and bank risk taking is marked significantly U-shaped curve. In addition,further estimates found that when executive pay reached 4 million 480 thousand Yuan,the bank performance from the rise to fall trend; executive pay reached5 million 940 thousand Yuan,the bank's risk level from the rise to fall. From the current level of executive pay( 2 million 254 thousand Yuan),the performance and risk of the banking industry in China is in a period of rising with the increase of executive pay. When the bank executive pay reaches critical value( 4 million 480thousand and 5 million 940 thousand Yuan),we should focus more on bank risk taking and the performance.
出处
《阅江学刊》
2016年第1期39-52,144-145,共14页
Yuejiang Academic Journal
基金
教育部人文社科基金"内部公司治理对银行风险承担行为影响研究"(10YJC790149)
