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基于委托-代理模型的创新型企业经营者激励机制设计 被引量:11

Incentive Mechanism Designation of Operators Innovative Enterprises Based on Principal-Agent Model
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摘要 基于委托—代理模型,结合创新型企业经营者的特性,从物质和精神两个层面上设计一套合理的激励机制,可以有效地促使经营者选择对所有者最有利的行动,进而增加企业利润。具体措施包括:薪酬激励、股权激励、工作设计激励、成就激励、荣誉激励、文化激励、道德和情感激励等。 In order to make the operators choose actions which benefit the owners and increase the enterprises' profits, this paper designs a kind of rational incentive mechanism according to the operators' specialities based on principal - agent model. Analysis results shows that there are some specific incentive measures, such as pay incentives, share right incentives, job designation incentives, success incentives, honor incentives, culture incentives, morality and feeling incentives and so on.
机构地区 南开大学
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第1期70-74,共5页 Soft Science
基金 教育部国家985创新工程基金项目"认知与创新经济学"
关键词 委托-代理模型 创新型企业 经营者 激励机制 principal - agent model innovative enterprises operators incentive mechanism
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