摘要
本文运用博弈理论对新建建筑节能的激励机制设计进行了深入研究。新建建筑节能是建筑节能的重要环节,尤其对于我国目前每年新建建筑数量庞大的现状,推进新建建筑节能工作显得尤为重要。如何设计激励政策,从而引导市场主体的投资行为,确保新建建筑达到或超过节能设计标准,是政策设计的难点。本文根据激励机制设计理论的基本观点,对新建建筑节能的激励政策目标、激励对象和激励力度等进行了定性分析,并建立了政府与开发商群体的进化博弈模型,得出政府应以资源环境和社会利益为重,锁定有远见的激励政策的结论,这一结论对促进新建建筑节能和实现建筑节能总体目标具有重要意义。
In this paper, the game theory was applied to deeply study the incentive mechanism design for new building energy efficiency. New building energy efficiency is an important part of building energy efficiency. A large number of new buildings are built in China each year, therefore, promoting new building energy efficiency is particularly important. It was difficult to design incentive policies and to guide the investment behavior of market players to ensure that new buildings could meet or exceed energy efficiency design standards. According to basic views of mechanism design theory, the qualitative analysis on policy objective, target and incentive strength of new building energy efficiency incentive was presented, and the evolutionary game model between the government and developer community was established. It was concluded that the government should focus on far-sighted incentive policies to achieve the interests of resource, environmental and social, which was of great significance to promote new building energy efficiency and to achieve the overall objective of building energy efficiency.
出处
《建筑科学》
北大核心
2009年第2期24-28,共5页
Building Science
关键词
博弈理论
新建建筑节能
激励政策
机制设计
game theory, new building energy efficiency, incentive policy, mechanism design
