摘要
缸中之脑假设是当代西方知识论中最重要的怀疑主义假设。对"我是否知道我不是缸中之脑"这个问题,当代西方知识论者有不同的看法。摩尔借助新常识实在论试图证明"我知道我没有被恶魔欺骗";普特南则借助语义外在主义试图证明"缸中之脑假设是自我反驳的",然而他们俩人的论证都是有问题的。诺齐克借助知识条件论对"我不知道我不是缸中之脑"作了论证;不变主义者布莱克则借用诺齐克的知识条件论得出了"我知道我不是缸中之脑"的结论。语境主义者德娄斯提出了一种折衷的方案:在日常语境下,我知道"我不是缸中之脑";在怀疑主义语境下,我不知道"我不是缸中之脑"。本文基本赞同语境主义者的看法。
The supposition of brains-in-a-vat is the most important argument of skepticism. There are different ideas of ＂whether I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat＂in the contemporary western epistemology. Moore attempted to prove that ＂I know I am not deceived by the evil demon＂ with the aid of the neo-commonsense realism, while Putnam drew support from the semantic externalism to attempt to prove that ＂the supposition of brains-in-a-vat is self- refuting＂, however their arguments are doubtful. Although Nozick has proved that ＂I do not know I am not a brain-in-a-vat＂ with the aid of the conditional theory of knowledge, Black drew the conclusion that ＂I know I am not a brain-in-a-vat＂ with the aid of the conditional theory of knowledge. Contextualist DeRose proposed one kind of middle course, namely： on the daily context, I know ＂I am not a brain-in-a-vat＂ ,while on the skeptical context, I do not know ＂I am not a brain-in-a-vat＂. In this paper, I generally agree with the contextualist idea.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期50-56,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(批准号:07JC720007)
第40批中国博士后科学基金(20060400594)阶段性成果之一
