摘要
最优合约理论基于经理人努力程度的信息非对称和外部法律环境完备的假设,通常围绕如何降低经理人的偷懒行为展开薪酬合约设计,既没有考虑事实存在的经理人对投资者利益的直接掠夺,也没有考虑外部法律环境对薪酬合约设计的影响。在一个存在经理人掠夺和引入法律对投资者利益保护变量的简单框架下,本文证明,经理人事先持股具有降低经理人掠夺投资者利益的承诺价值,从而在一定意义上回答了存在经理人掠夺时的经理人股权激励的设计问题。进一步考察外部法律环境对经理人股权激励的影响,我们发现,如果法律对投资者利益保护越弱,投资者应该允许的经理人最优持股比例越高。
The optimal contract approach, which is based on the assumption of informational asymmetry of management＇ s effort and complete legal investor protection, emphasizes on how to reduce the shirking of management when designing management compensation contracts. However, this contract design does not consider the management expropriation to investor＇s interest, but also ignore the existing effect of legal protection to the management compensation contracts. Under a simple framework of the existence of management expropriation and legal investor protection variable introduced, this paper proves that management ex ante shareholding has the commitment value of decreasing the expropriation level of investor＇s interest, and thus in some sense addresses the management compensation contract design when management expropriation exists. By further investigating the effect of legal investor protection to the design of management compensation contract, the author suggests that external investors should allow management to hold more shares if the legal protection to investors is weak.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第12期92-102,共11页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
经理人掠夺
薪酬合约设计
承诺价值
投资者利益保护
management expropriation, compensation contract design, commitment value, legal investor protection.
