摘要
在最优契约假说和管理者权力假说的框架下,从资本结构调整速度和实际资本结构偏离目标资本结构程度两个方面,实证考察管理者超额薪酬对资本结构动态调整的影响。研究发现:管理者超额薪酬越高,资本结构调整速度越快;非国有上市公司的管理者超额薪酬越高,实际资本结构偏离目标资本结构的程度越低,但这一关系在国有上市公司并不成立,这可能是由于预算软约束等原因导致国有上市公司资本结构异化所引起。整体而言,管理者超额薪酬更多地反映了管理者能力的大小,领取高薪的管理者更有可能根据内外部环境的变化迅速调整公司的资本结构决策,表明最优契约假说仍然具有很强的适用性。
Based on optimal contracting approach and managerial power approach,this paper empirically exams influence of managerial excess compensation on capital structure adjustment from both aspect of capital structure adjustment speed and extent of actual capital structure biased from the target capital structure. Result shows that the higher the managerial excess compensation is,the quicker the capital structure adjusts. It also finds that the higher the managerial excess compensation is,the lower extent the actual capital structure biases from the target capital structure in the non state-owned enterprises. However,the relationship doesn’t exist in the state-owned enterprises,which may be caused by the dissimilatory capital structure due to soft budget constraint. Overall,the managerial excess compensation more likely indicates the ability of managers,and managers of high compensation adjust capital structure more quickly according to the environment of corporate. Optimal contracting approach suggests strong applicability.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期148-156,共9页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"管理防御
资本结构与公司业绩研究"(11BGL028)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目"管理防御与资本结构问题研究"(2011009511003)资助
关键词
最优契约假说
管理者权力假说
超额薪酬
资本结构
optimal contracting approach
managerial power approach
excess compensation
capital structure
