摘要
本文基于法与金融的视角,以2003-2010年我国上市家族企业为样本,研究家族企业实际控制人担任领导职务对公司治理的作用机制。本文发现与Burkart et al.(2003)的理论研究刚好相反,在法律环境较好的地区,我国家族企业实际控制人更愿意担任领导职务。本文还发现家族企业实际控制人担任领导职务有利于减少两类代理成本,增加投资效率,最终提高了企业绩效,并且这些影响在法律环境较好的地区更为显著。进一步研究还发现实际控制人担任领导职务的任期与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,而且在法律环境较好的地区,其影响更为显著,而实际控制人卸任会对家族企业绩效造成负向影响,不过法律环境越好,其负向影响越小。
From the perspective of law and finance, this paper tests the ultimate controller＇s governance mechanism in Chinese family firms. Contrary to the theory by Burkart et al. （2003）, we find that the ultimate controllers are more likely to serve as top managers in Chinese areas with better legal environments. And the ultimate controller＇s leadership could reduce a- gency cost, increase investment efficiency, and eventually improve firm performance. These effects are more significant in areas with better legal environments. Further studies show an inverted U-shaped relationship between ultimate controller＇s tenure and firm performance, and the turnover of ultimate controller has significantly negative impact on firm performance, but its negative effect is less significant in areas with better legal environments.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期80-94,共15页
China Economic Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目(14XJC790007)
西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费2014年度重大基础理论研究项目(JBK141107)
西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JBK1207042)的资助
关键词
家族企业
实际控制人
代理成本
法律环境
企业绩效
family firm
ultimate controller
agency cost
legal environment
firm performance
