摘要
本文运用理论分析与实证分析,研究了不同媒体监督渠道对公司治理代理成本的影响,并得到如下结论:媒体作为公司治理的外部机制,能够缓解利益主体间信息不对称,降低公司代理成本,代理问题严重的企业更容易受到媒体关注。此外,由于代理关系和媒体传播渠道的不同,媒体监督对代理成本的影响存在差异,媒体报道能显著降低股东与经理层、债权人之间的代理成本,而且传统媒体对第二类代理成本的影响比社交媒体更加显著。
Theoretical analysis and empirical analysis are used in this paper to study the influences of different media supervision channels on the agency costs of the corporate governance.The conclusions we get are as follows:As an external mechanism of corporate governance,the media can alleviate information asymmetry between stakeholders and reduce agency costs.Media attentions are more likely to focus on enterprises with serious agent problems.In addition,due to differences in agency relationships and media communication channels,media surveillance has different impacts on agency costs.Media reports can significantly reduce agency costs between shareholders and managers or creditors.Traditional media has a more significant impact on the second agency costs than social media.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第10期16-27,共12页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
海南省哲学社会科学2018年规划课题(HNSK(QN)18-10)
海南省社会科学重大委托项目(HNSK(ZD)19-108).
关键词
媒体监督
代理成本
传统媒体
社交媒体
Media supervision
Agency cost
Traditional media
Social media
