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人工智能法律主体地位的法哲学研究

The Legal Philosophy Research on the Legal Subject Status of Artificial Intelligence
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摘要 人类作为法律主体时是理性对象,人工智能属于绝对理性对象。对于人工智能是否具有法律主体地位,从法哲学视角对人展开主体性研究,哲学史上产生了人作为主体的认识,为法律主体适用提供了理论支持。但是在法律框架中,人工智能要想完全复制人类的意识是不存在的,这是无生命体与生命体之间最本质的差别。人工智能即便可以模拟人类思想,对客观事物进行理性判断,但由于不具备情感欲望,其具有的绝对理性也只是一种机械化的运作模式。透过解析法律主体的本质,对人工智能法哲学本质进行对比探索,明确人工智能不能作为欲望法律主体和拟制法律主体。 Human as the subject of law is the rational object, artificial intelligence belongs to the absolute rational object. As for whether artificial intelligence has the status of legal subject, the study of human subjectivity is carried out from the perspective of legal philosophy. In the history of philosophy, the understanding of human being as the subject has been generated, which provides theoretical support for the application of legal subject. However, in the legal framework, there is no way for artificial intelligence to fully replicate human consciousness, which is the most essential difference between inanimate body and living body. Even if artificial intelligence can simulate human thoughts and make rational judgments on objective things, its absolute rationality is only a mechanized operation mode because it does not have emotional desire. Through analyzing the essence of legal subject, this paper makes a comparative exploration of the essence of artificial intelligence law philosophy, and makes clear that artificial intelligence cannot be regarded as the subject of desire law and the subject of fictive law.
作者 韦昕
机构地区 贵州大学法学院
出处 《哲学进展》 2022年第5期1224-1229,共6页 Advances in Philosophy
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