摘要
当代认识论研究逐步形成的一个共识是:知识是一种认知成就,认知主体的认知能力(智识德性)需要对知识的获取做出必要的贡献。这种"知识的荣膺观"为德性认识论所采纳,有助于克服盖梯尔问题所引发的认知运气难题,但在处理证言知识时却遭遇困难。因此,有必要构建一种"反运气德性认识论",重新审视认知能力的作用与排除认知运气的关系,使得德性认识论能够在容纳证言知识的同时克服认知运气难题。
A widely accepted view in recent epistemological literature is that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement which is primarily credible to subject's cognitive faculties. This deserving credit view of knowledge is adopted by virtue epistemology. It is helpful to overcome the luck problem inspired by Gettier cases but difficult to accommodate testimonial knowledge. By analyzing the dilemma of the deserving credit view of knowledge and some related suggestions,this article suggests that the proper function of cognitive faculties and exclusion of epistemic luck should not be treated as two independent factors of knowing. A modified version of anti-luck virtue epistemology is proposed to solve the dilemma of the deserving credit view of knowledge.
出处
《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期25-32,共8页
Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"认知哲学研究"(13JZD004)
国家社科基金重大项目"当代知识论的系列研究"(14ZDB012)