摘要
智猪博弈模型提供了一个地方政府与公民社会协同治理环境的行动逻辑。以"智猪博弈"模型讨论作为博弈参与人的地方政府和公民社会的环境治理偏好,可以清晰地描述地方政府与公民社会的环保行动逻辑,解释政治晋升锦标赛制度语境下的环境治理悖论。依据博弈"规则制导"的核心启示,破解环境治理悖论需要以"放权"和"赋权"的两手,以位移制度开关设置和扩大预期制度红利增量的协同性制度变迁,督促地方政府和公民社会从"等待"走向环境治理的"行动"。
Environmental governance is essential to sustainable development. Starting from the environmental governance paradox, the paper presents a visual clustering map of the literature with Cite Space. It discusses the environmental governance preferences of local governments and civil society as participants of the game by using the Boxed Pigs Game, describes the logic of environmental action between government and civil society, and explains the paradox of environmental governance in the context of political promotion championship system. According to the 'rule guidance' of the game, it requires both 'decentralization' and 'empowerment' to resolve the environmental governance paradox. Institutional changes, such as increasing expected institutional dividend and setting shift switch, must be made to urge local government and civil society participation from 'waiting' to 'taking action'.
出处
《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期85-93,共9页
Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"雾霾治理语境下首都经济圈府际协同模式研究"(14BZZ050)
国家社会科学基金项目"基于‘四个全面’的国家治理战略研究"(16ZZD015)
关键词
环境治理
公民社会
公民参与
地方政府
智猪博弈
environmental governance
civil society
civic participation
local government
Boxed Pigs Game
