摘要
基于双渠道供应链成员权力的差异,构建制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈,零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈及同等权力的Nash博弈模型,探讨三种博弈对渠道价格、需求及博弈参与者利润的影响。研究发现:(1)当需求交叉价格弹性系数为0时,三种博弈策略对双渠道供应链竞争均衡解的影响是无差异的。(2)当需求交叉价格弹性系数不为0时,在零售商(制造商)主导的Stackelberg博弈下,传统渠道(直销渠道)定价最高,此时的传统渠道(直销渠道)需求最小,而传统渠道需求(直销渠道需求)却在制造商(零售商)主导的Stackelberg博弈下最大;制造商和零售商都愿意选择放弃权力而愿做Stackelberg博弈跟随者,且Nash博弈始终是博弈参与者的严格下策。最后通过算例分析,进一步检验了所得结论的有效性。
Based on members' different bargaining power in a dual channels system,this paper discusses the impact of three games on channel pricing,demand and members' profits by building Manufacturer Stackelberg,Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash game model.The main findings are:(1)if cross-price elasticity of demand is equal to 0,the impact of three games on dual-channel supply chain competition results is identical;(2)if cross-price elasticity of demand is not equal to 0,the price of the traditional channel(direct channel)is the highest in Retailer Stackelberg game(Manufacturer Stackelberg),which lead to the minimum demand in the traditional channel(direct channel),but the demand of the traditional channel(direct channel)is the biggest in Manufacturer Stackelberg(Retailer Stackelberg);from the perspective of members' profits,both manufacturers and retailers are more willing to give up the power and act as the Stackelberg followers,and furthermore Nash game is a strictly dominated strategy.In the end,a numerical example is used to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第3期52-59,共8页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103077)
中国博士后科学基金第六批特别资助项目(2013T60880)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-13-0267)
兰州大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(13LZUJBWTD004
14LZUJBWZD003)
