摘要
文章基于企业社会责任(CSR)行为的产品差异化角色,利用批发价合同建立一条由一个上游制造商和两个下游零售商(1和2)构成的双渠道供应链运作博弈模型。其中,零售商1采用CSR行为在最终产品市场中进行产品差异化。该产品差异化将整个最终产品市场划分为由认可零售商1的CSR行为的消费者构成的CSR分段和由不认可零售商1的CSR行为的消费者构成的NCSR分段。博弈顺序为,首先,制造商制定批发价格;其次,零售商制定零售价格;最后,零售商1选择最优的CSR行为水平。对模型均衡界结果进行比较静态分析。均衡批发价格的比较显示,制造商采用较低的批发价来激励零售商1实施CSR行为。进一步,随着消费者基础购买价值(消费者对零售商1的CSR行为的认可度、零售商1的CSR行为效率)的增加,零售商1的CSR业绩、制造商对两个零售的批发价格、两个零售商的最终产品市场价格和三个供应链节点企业的经济业绩(利润)均增加(增加、增加)。最后,零售商1的CSR行为通过产品差异化降低了产品市场NCSR分段的竞争程度。
Based on the product differentiation role of corporate social responsibility(CSR),employing the wholesale price contract,a game model is built on dual-channel supply chain operations where an upstream manufacturer sells to two downstream retailers(1 and 2) and retailer 1 uses CSR activities to differentiate in the final market.The product differentiation divides the final market into two parts:one consists of consumers who accept retailer 1 's CSR activities;the other is composed of consumers who do not accept them.The comparative statics on the equilibrium shows that the manufacture sells to retailer 1 at a lower wholesale price to stimulate it conduct CSR activities.Further,as consumers' base utility(the degree of consumers' CSR acceptance,retailer 1's CSR conducting efficiency) increases,retailer 1's CSR performance,the manufacturer's wholesale prices,the retailing prices and supply chain members' economic performance increase.Finally,retailer 1 's CSR activities weaken the competitiveness in the NCSR market segment via product differentiation.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第S2期453-460,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272129)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-11-0064)
电子科技大学百人计划
中青年学术带头人培养计划资助项目
关键词
企业社会责任
供应链
产品差异化
批发价合同
双渠道竞争
corporate social responsibility
supply chain
product differentiation
wholesale price contract
dualchannel competition
