摘要
引入电商效率系数比较研究是否具有公平偏好的两类条件下的供应链激励机制,发现在无公平偏好下零售商所付出的最优努力水平与合同激励系数正相关、与产品批发价格无关、与零售商风险规避程度和商品销售量波动程度负相关,制造商给予零售商的最优激励系数与产品批发价格正相关、与零售商销售产品边际利润负相关;而在无公平偏好下激励系数对于零售商的正向激励作用未变,当激励合同中固定收入满足一定条件时,零售商的努力水平就会大于其在无公平偏好下的努力水平,并且固定收入越多其为销售产品付出的努力就越多。同时发现在电子商务背景下电商效率系数的引入对制造商和整个渠道的收益具有明显的正向关系。最后通过计算机仿真验证了研究结果。
This paper studies the incentive mechanism of supply chain under two kinds of conditions of fair preference by comparing the efficiency coefficient of e-commerce.It is found that there is a positive correlation between the optimal effort level of retailer and the incentive coefficient of contract under the condition of fair preference or not, it has nothing to do with wholesale price,negative correlation with risk aversion of retailer and fluctuation degree of commodity sales,the optimal incentive coefficient given by manufacturer to retailer is positively related to wholesale price of products,and negatively related to marginal profit of retailer selling product.When the fixed income in incentive contract meets certain conditions,the retailer's level of effort will be greater than its level of effort in the absence of fair preference,while the positive incentive effect of incentive coefficient on retailers is not changed under the non-fair preference,when the fixed income in incentive contract meets certain conditions,the retailer's level of effort will be greater than its level of effort,and the more fixed income it pays for selling products,the more effort it will make.Finally,the research results are verified by computer simulation.
作者
陈畴镛
张永森
Chen Chouyong;Zhang Yongsen(The Research Center of Information Technology &Economic and Social Development,Hangzhou Dianzi University;School of Economics,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第23期187-197,共11页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"电子商务驱动的产业集群转型升级与竞争力提升研究"(U1509220)
关键词
完全理性
公平偏好
电商效率系数
供应链渠道
激励机制
entirely rational
fairness preference
e-commerce efficiency coefficient
supply chain channel
incentive mechanism
