摘要
为有效监管网络货运平台,构建国家级监管部门-省级监管部门-网络货运平台-社会公众四方主体演化博弈模型,通过四方主体的复制动态方程计算得到博弈模型的16个纯策略均衡点,其中无绝对稳定点,有9个一定条件下的稳定点,分析9个稳定点的稳定条件,并通过数值仿真分析理想策略组合(0,1,1,0)下,监管系统参数变化时四方主体协同监管策略的演化路径。结果表明:不同层级的政府监管部门间的协调交互能促进监管系统的稳定性,增大国家级监管部门对省级监管部门消极监管的处罚力度,提高对省级监管部门积极监管的奖励,均能促进省级监管部门与网络货运平台更快达到稳定的策略组合;增大对网络货运平台合规运营的奖励较适合作为短期监管策略;加大对网络货运平台违规运营的处罚力度,能促使网络货运平台迅速演化至合规运营的稳定状态,提高惩罚力度是更优的监管方式,更有利于治理网络货运平台违规运营现象;限制网络货运平台违规运营的收益是有意义的治理策略;增大社会公众对网络货运平台违规运营举报奖励仅在前期能提高公众参与监管的积极性。
To effectively regulate network freight platform,a four-party collaborative regulatory game model is constructed,involving national regulatory authorities,provincial regulatory authorities,network freight platform,and the general public.Through the calculation of the replicator dynamic equations of the four entities,16 pure strategy equilibrium points are derived,among which there are no absolute stable points,but 9 stable points under certain conditions.The stability conditions of these 9 stable points are analyzed,and the evolution paths of the strategies of the four parties are examined through numerical simulations under the ideal strategy combination(0,1,1,0) when regulatory system parameters change.The results show that coordination and interaction between different levels of government regulatory authorities can enhance the stability of the regulatory system.Increasing penalties from national regulatory authorities for passive regulation by provincial authorities and increasing rewards for active regulation can facilitate quicker achievement of stable strategy combinations between provincial authorities and network freight platform.Increasing rewards for compliant operations of network freight platform is more suitable as a short-term regulatory strategy.Strengthening penalties for non-compliant operations of network freight platform can quickly evolve them towards a stable compliant operation state,indicating that increasing penalties is a more effective regulatory approach for addressing non-compliance issues.Limiting the profits from non-compliant operations is a meaningful governance strategy,while increasing rewards for public reporting of non-compliant behavior by the network freight platform mainly improves public participation in regulation in the early stages.
作者
甘卫华
段慧星
桂夏芸
刘郑
GAN Weihua;DUAN Huixing;GUI Xiayun;LIU Zheng(School of Transportation Engineering,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330013,China;Zhejiang Zhongtong Communications Co.,Ltd.,Hangzhou 310014,China)
出处
《山东交通学院学报》
CAS
2024年第4期29-38,共10页
Journal of Shandong Jiaotong University
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72061013)
江西省重点研发计划“揭榜挂帅”项目(20223BBE51038)。
关键词
网络货运平台
四方演化博弈
平台治理
政府监管
network freight platform
four-party evolutionary game
plaform governance
government regulation
