摘要
有不少学者提出苏格拉底的德性可教命题充满悖论,理由是苏格拉底反对从实践(σκητν)获得德性。然而从σκητν的古希腊文原义出发,σκητν所指的并不是“实践”而是“训练”,那么学者们基于“实践”推导出的结论就不可靠。基于苏格拉底的哲学立场可知,他的结论实际是:真正知识的德性可教,非知识的德性不可教。且结合柏拉图的诸多早中期对话,发现苏格拉底不但没有否认通过实践可以获得德性,而且认可通过训练可以获得德性。苏格拉底的德性教育不只是一种启发式教育,更是引导学生进行理性“训练”的过程。对σκητν的词义追溯和文本分析可知,《美诺》中的德性可教并非矛盾,由此澄清了苏格拉底对理性训练的重视和对实践的真实态度,回归到苏格拉底德性可教的本意。
Many scholars have proposed that Socrates’proposition that virtue can be taught is full of paradoxes.The reason is that Socrates opposed obtaining virtue from practice(σκητν).However,starting from the original meaning ofσκητνin ancient Greece,whatσκητνrefers to is not“practice”but“training”,so the conclusions deduced by scholars based on“practice”are not reliable.From the philosophical standpoint of Socrates,his conclusion is that the virtue of true knowledge can be taught,and the virtue of non-knowledge cannot be taught.Combined with Plato’s early and middle dialogues,it is found that Socrates did not oppose that virtue can be obtained through practice,while recognizes that virtue can be obtained through training.Socrates’virtue education is not only a heuristic teaching,but also a process of guiding students to carry out rational“training”.It explains that the virtue teachable in Meno is not a contradiction by checking back the meaning ofσκητνand analyzing the text.It clarifies Socrates’emphasis on rational training and his true attitude towards practice,and returns to Socrates’original intention that virtue can be taught.
作者
倪艳
NI Yan(Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu Anhui 241000,China;Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)
出处
《教育学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第4期14-26,共13页
Journal of Educational Studies
基金
安徽高校人文社会科学研究重点项目“高校‘三全育人’理念下隐性教育路径研究”(SK2019A0274)
国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国古代个体道德生成机制对新时代公民道德建设的启示研究”(20BZX119)。
关键词
苏格拉底
德性可教
实践
训练
Socrates
virtue can be taught
practice
train
