摘要
本文基于回收目标责任制下一些制造商会将回收业务外包给共同回收商的商业实践,研究由一个回收商、两个制造商和一个零售商构成的三阶段闭环供应链的最优定价决策和回收努力水平,建立了6个博弈模型分析供应链中不同渠道领导权力结构和两个制造商之间的梯队优势对最优定价和回收努力水平的影响,并选取手机市场的相关数据进行算例分析。研究结果表明,当考虑制造商竞争时,从提高旧产品的回收努力水平或者制造商的角度来说,回收商为渠道领导者不是坏事。制造商的梯队优势对两个制造商都是有利的,弱势制造商可以接受强势制造商的领导,但制造商的梯队优势对零售商和回收商是不利的。对回收商而言,当外包回收活动的制造商之间具有梯队优势时,回收商可以选择市场份额较低的强势制造商或者市场份额较高的弱势制造商来缓解制造商的梯队优势带来的不利影响。
In recent years,rapid economic growth has accelerated the upgrading of electronic products such as mobile phones and computers,resulting in a huge amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE).Irregular treatment of WEEE,such as by incineration or landfill,poses great threats to human health and the environment.Thus,how efficiently recycling and disposing of WEEE has become an urgent issue that requires worldwide attention.Reasonable recycling and disposal of WEEE can contribute to the goal of carbon neutrality,and thus the Chinese government is encouraging home appliance manufacturers to implement the recycling target responsibility system.At the same time,the government pointed out that manufacturers participating in such implementation must strengthen cooperation with recycling enterprises.In this context,an increasing number of manufacturers outsource the recycling of used products to third parties.Therefore,how manufacturers must motivate the recyclers to improve their efforts and achieve targets has become an urgent problem to be solved.Furthermore,product pricing and level of recycling efforts are largely influenced by the relative positions of channel members in the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)that are,with two competing manufacturers,related to two factors:channel leadership and echelon dominance.Therefore,the effect of the echelon dominance between competing manufacturers on the members′strategies and profits under different channel leadership structures is another issue that needs solutions.Based on the commercial practice of many manufacturers that outsource the recycling of used products to co-recyclers under the recycling target responsibility system,this study examines the optimal pricing decision and recycling efforts of a three-stage CLSC consisting of one recycler,two manufacturers and one retailer.First,based on game theory,six game models under different channel leadership structures and echelon dominance are constructed.Second,the explicit solutions of the optimal pricing deci
作者
王竟竟
许民利
WANG Jingjing;XU Mini(School of Business Administration,Hunan University of Finance and Economics,Changsha 410000,China;School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410000,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第4期222-238,共17页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL099)。
关键词
共同回收商
梯队优势
渠道权力结构
闭环供应链
Common recycler
Echelon dominance
Channel leadership structures
Closed-loop supply chain
