摘要
研究零售商主导的闭环供应链奖惩机制问题,分别建立了四个博弈模型:政府对制造商实施奖惩机制;政府对回收商实施奖惩机制;政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制以及同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制。研究表明:政府对制造商实施奖惩机制、政府对回收商实施奖惩机制以及政府同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制三种情形下零售价、回收率和批发价相等,且总利润相等;政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制与其它情形相比,废旧产品的回收率较低,批发价较高,且总利润降低,但四种情形下零售价相同;当政府同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制时,若制造商承担的回收责任较大,则闭环供应链成员都能从奖惩机制中获益。
In recent years,Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment(WEEE)with significant environmental attribute,has attracted more and more attention of the public.The government has also emphasized the collection of WEEE with legislation to prevent pollution,such as the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR).Despite of the laws and the efforts of the public,the environment still faces serious challenge.The government,further,has adopted several incentive mechanisms,such as subsidy,to encourage enterprises to collect WEEE.Based on these incentive policies,the reward-penalty mechanism(RPM)is proposed to increase the collection rate.In the RPM,the government sets the reward-penalty intensity and target collection rate.The enterprise will receive reward(penalty,resp.)if the actual collection rate is higher(lower,resp.)than the target collection rate.In addition,given the difficulty of collecting WEEE,the collection responsibility-sharing has been investigated in this paper.With the advance of the retail,the retailers,such as WAL-MART,SUNING,GOME and etc.,play a more important role in the supply chain.Therefore,in this paper,a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model is developed,in which the retailer is a Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer and the third-party collector are followers.Then four cases are studied respectively:the government implements the RPM to manufacturer(Case M);the government implements RPM to the third-party collector(Case TP);the government implements RPM to manufacturer and retailer simultaneously(Case MR);the government implements RPM to manufacturer and the third-party collector simultaneously(Case MTP).With the comparison and analysis of the equilibrium,the main results are showed as follows.(i)Under Case M,Case TPand Case MTP,the retail prices,the collection rates,the wholesale prices and the total profits of the CLSC are respectively equal.(ii)Compared with other three cases,Case MRresults in lower collection rate,higher wholesale price and lower total profit of the CLSC,while the retail price unde
作者
王文宾
丁军飞
王智慧
达庆利
WANG Wen-bin;DING Jun-fei;WANG Zhi-hui;DA Qing-li(School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;Jiangsu province's energy economy management research base, Xuzhou 221116, China;School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第7期127-136,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571042)
能源矿业经济智库(2018WHCC01)
四川循环经济研究中心重点项目(XHJJ-1902)
