摘要
现有立法关于董事信义义务的规定侧重于忠实义务,欠缺对勤勉义务的合理配置。破产阶段董事勤勉义务由虚置转向实置的逻辑根源,在于默示合同内容的显现、委托相互作用的影响与债权人参与治理的突出。董事既须在原有勤勉义务基础上增补义务内容,拓宽信息披露义务的范围及方式、设置谨慎决策义务的调查前置程序,还须在破产准备阶段履行新增的勤勉义务,包括破产申请或重整准备等程序抉择义务、中小债权人特殊对接义务。董事违反对债权人勤勉义务承担责任,须区分个人责任与集体责任,以实际经营管理权标准作为认定标准,以事先与事后行为的相互补正作为责任减免事由。
The existing legislation on fiduciary duty of directors focuses on the duty of loyalty,and lacks the reasonable allocation of the duty of diligence.The logical origin of directors'duty of diligence in bankruptcy stage is the appearance of implied contract content,the influence of entrustment interaction and the prominence of creditors'participation in governance.On the ba-sis of the original duty of diligence,the directors shall not only supplement the content of the obligation,broaden the scope and mode of the obligation of information disclosure,set up the pre-investigation procedure of the duty of prudent decision,but also perform the new duty of diligence in the bankruptcy preparation stage,including the procedural choice obligation of bankruptcy application or reorganization preparation,and special docking obligation of small and medium-sized creditors.When a director is liable for a breach of his duty of diligence to creditors,he must distinguish between individual liability and collective liability,take the standard of actual operation and management as the criterion,and take the mutual correction of prior and subsequent acts as the cause of liability remission.
出处
《荆楚法学》
2024年第3期53-63,共11页
Jingchu Law Review
关键词
勤勉义务
债权人利益
破产程序
信义义务
董事责任
Duty of Diligence
Interest of Creditors
Bankruptcy Proceedings
Fiduciary Du-ty
Director's Responsibility
