摘要
董仲舒的‚原心定罪‛主张直接催生了汉代法治的‚《春秋》决狱‛实践。通常对‚原心定罪‛的解释会援引董仲舒的‚德主刑辅‛‚阳德阴刑‛思想,将阴阳与刑德比附论证。然而,这一解读方式忽略了董仲舒‚原心定罪‛主张在其篇章中与仁义、审慎论述的相关性。从伦理视角看,董仲舒将‚仁‛理解为泛爱与理性思考,推究得到‚慎‛这一态度;将‚义‛理解为内在规范力量,推究得到‚以经正义‛这一方式,因而‚原心定罪‛无需通过阴阳比附论证也可成立。这种对董仲舒德刑思想的解读方式,有助于董仲舒伦理思想和政治思想的现代化理解。此外,董仲舒对道德主体的行为自主性有更明显的肯定,动机在确定主体道德责任时有更重要的地位,这展现出他有在当代被解读为理由内在主义者的可能性。
Dong Zhongshu’s advocacy of“judging a person according to his or her motives”directly gave birth to the legal practice of deciding cases according to the principles of The Spring and Autumn Annals in the Han Dynasty.Typically,interpretations of“judging a person according to his or her motives”invoke his ideas of“morality given priority over penalty”and“morality as yang and penalty as yin”,comparing and justifying morality and penalty through the principles of yin and yang.However,this interpretation neglects the relevance of his advocacy of“judging a person according to his or her motives”to benevolence,righteousness,and prudence discussed in his writings.From an ethical perspective,he understood“benevolence”as universal love and rational thinking,leading to the attitude of“prudence.”He interprets“righteousness”as an internal normative force,resulting in the approach of“upholding justice through the classics.”Therefore,the advocacy of“judging a person according to his or her motives”can stand without relying on the comparison and justification of yin and yang.This interpretation of his thoughts on morality and penalty contributes to a modern understanding of his ethical and political philosophy.Furthermore,he had a more explicit affirmation of the behavioral autonomy of moral agents,with motives playing a more significant role in determining the moral responsibility of the subject,suggesting the possibility of his being interpreted as a contemporary internalist of reasons.
作者
洪博文
HONG Bowen(School of Philosophy,Renmin University,Beijing,100872,China)
出处
《衡水学院学报》
2024年第3期28-35,共8页
Journal of Hengshui University
关键词
董仲舒
原心定罪
仁义
理由内在主义
Dong Zhongshu
judging a person according to his or her motives
benevolence and righteousness
internalism of reasons
