摘要
将2015年实施的“限薪令”政策视为衡量薪酬管制的准自然实验,基于2012—2022年A股非金融上市公司数据,采用双重差分模型检验“限薪令”对企业金融化的影响,探究薪酬管制对企业“脱虚还实”效果。研究结果表明:薪酬管制政策显著抑制了国有企业金融资产的配置行为,主要通过抑制国有企业金融化的“蓄水池”动机和降低管理层风险偏好两种机制降低企业金融资产配置比例,促进企业“脱虚还实”;薪酬管制政策对金融资产类型和金融渠道获利存在结构性差异,表现为对投机型和保值型金融资产以及风险型金融渠道获利抑制效果更为明显;薪酬管制政策通过积极影响企业核心业务与实体投资,促进企业资源优化配置。
Considering the"pay ceiling order"policy implemented in 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment for assessing compensation control,this study utilizes A-share non-financial listed company data from 2012 to 2022.A double-difference model is employed to examine the impact of the"pay ceiling order"on the financialization of enterprises and explore the effect of salary limit on the phenomenon of enterprises'"transformation from virtual to real".The findings of the research are as follows:Firstly,the compensation control policy significantly restrains the asset allocation behavior of state-owned enterprises.This is primarily achieved by suppressing the"reservoir"motivation for financialization and lowering the risk preferences of management,thereby encouraging enterprises to shift from virtual to real assets.Secondly,the compensation control policy exhibits structural differences in the profitability of financial asset types and channels.It manifests a more pronounced inhibitory effect on speculative and hedging financial assets,as well as risk-prone financial channels.Finally,the compensation control policy actively influences the core business and tangible investments of enterprises,promoting the optimization of resource allocation in enterprises.
作者
李冬伟
方俊
LI Dongwei;FANG Jun(School of Economics and Management,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330100,China)
出处
《经济与管理》
北大核心
2024年第3期55-64,共10页
Economy and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72162017)。
关键词
薪酬管制
企业金融化
蓄水池动机
管理层风险偏好
salary limit
corporate financialization
reservoir motivation
management risk preference
