摘要
如何完善激励机制是现代企业治理的重要内容,更是全面深化国企改革成败的关键环节。作为一项国家治理机制,2015年中央政府针对央企实施的《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》是否会提升央企投资效率?这是我们关注的主要问题。研究发现:该薪酬改革方案抑制了央企的投资效率,并且相较于(高管)高晋升预期和垄断型的企业,该方案对低晋升预期和竞争型公司投资效率的负向影响更大。进一步研究发现,该薪酬改革方案对央企投资所产生的负效应主要源于其增加了代理成本,且该负效应主要表现为投资不足而非投资过度。因此,本文的研究将有助于深化薪酬制度改革中存在的争议探讨,并为进一步推进国企综合改革、提升国企经营效率提供了一定的理论依据和政策参考。
How to improve incentive mechanism is a vital part of modern enterprise governance,but also the critical link to comprehensively deepen the result of the state-owned enterprise reform.As a crucial national governance system,the Compensation Reform Program of Executives of Central Enterprises implemented by the central government in early 2015.Whether the Compensation Reform Program will exert an incentive effect and improve investment efficiency of central enterprises,which is our main concern.The research of this paper finds that:the compensation reform plan will restrain the investment efficiency of central enterprises,and the greater the competition degree of the enterprises and the lower the promotion expectation of the executives,the more negative impact of the policy on the investment efficiency.Further research shows that the negative effect of the reform plan on the investment efficiency of central enterprises is mainly due to the increase of agency cost,and the negative effect is mainly manifested in insufficient investment rather than excessive investment.The research will help to clarify the disputes about the effect of pay limit in SOEs.It also adds a new theoretical basis and policy reference for deepening the reform of SOEs.
作者
刘星
台文志
Liu Xing;Tai Wenzhi
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第10期112-126,共15页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004)
国家自然科学基金项目(71802029)的资助。
关键词
中央企业
高管薪酬激励
薪酬管制
投资效率
Central Enterprises
Executive Compensation Incentive
Pay Limit
Investment Efficiency
