摘要
以2007-2018年我国上市公司为样本,基于长短期综合决策视角,使用双重差分法(DID)研究限薪对晋升体系下央企高管行为模式的影响。研究发现,中央国有企业在限薪令出台后,其盈余管理、冗员负担及研发投入水平均有不同程度的提升。这说明在薪酬管制后,现有激励体系中的晋升激励作用得到了加强,进而影响了央企高管的行为模式。除了考虑业绩指标外,高管会着眼于承担更多社会责任、提升创新水平等长期目标以谋求晋升,以综合决策效益使其更接近晋升的最终目标。
This article takes 2007-2018 listed companies in China as a sample,and based on the perspective of long-term and short-term comprehensive decision-making,uses the double-difference method(DID)to study the impact of the exogenous;event of salary limit on the behavioral model of central enterprise executives under the promotion system.Through research,it has been found that the state-owned enterprises have significantly improved their earnings management,redundant staffing,and R&D investment levels to varying degrees after the introduction of the salary limit order.The result shows that after the salary control,the promotion incentive role in the existing incentive system has been strengthened,which has further affected the behavioral model of central enterprise executives.Specifically,in addition to considering performance indicators in the traditional sense,executives will focus on long-term goals such as taking on more social responsibility and improving innovation to seek promotion,with a view to comprehensive decision-making benefits is closer to the ultimate goal of promotion.The research conclusions provide new research ideas for optimizing the incentive system of state-owned enterprises and guiding executive decision-making behaviors.
作者
张宏亮
王法锦
王殿杰
ZHANG Hongliang;WANG Fajin;WANG Dianjie(School of Business,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China;Agricultural Development Bank of China,Beijing 100045,China;School of Statistics and Mathematics,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2020年第6期79-86,共8页
Economy and Management
基金
北京市社会科学基金重点项目(19GLA007)
教育部人文社科规划基金项目(20YJA630089)。
关键词
薪酬管制
国企高管
锦标赛
双重差分
salary control
state--owned enterprise executives
championship
DID
