摘要
利普斯以代入感来阐释陌己认识,但舍勒认定利普斯的阐释是唯我论的。尽管如此,利普斯的思想却为舍勒陌己认识理论的建构提供了启迪。舍勒认为,利普斯陷入唯我论的根本症结在于面临从本己向陌己过渡的难题。舍勒则回避了这一问题,主张一种“直接性”的陌己认识理论。一方面,他通过对利普斯“表达”概念的推进,揭示出陌己体验的直接被给予性;另一方面,借助“现象学直观”,阐明了对陌己心灵领域本质性的直接认识。这两方面的直接性共同塑造了一种超越利普斯的对陌己认识的非唯我论新诠释。
Lipps interprets the knowledge of others with empathy,but Scheler contends that Lipps’interpretation is solipsistic.Nevertheless,Lipps’thought have served as inspiration for Scheler in constructing his theory ofunderstanding others.Scheler considers that the root of Lipps’solipsism lies in the challenge of transitioning from the self-knowledge to the knowledge of others.On the contrary,Scheler avoids this predicament by advocating a“direct”theory of how we know others.On the one hand,by advancing Lipps’concept of“expression”,Scheler shows how the experience of others can be given directly.On the other hand,by way of“phenomenological intuition”,he clarifies the essentially direct knowledge of the mental realm of others.The dual“directness”of these two aspects shapes a non-solipsistic reinterpretation of how we know others that goes beyond Lipps.
出处
《哲学分析》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期47-58,196,197,共14页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社科基金项目“德国古典哲学的现象学阐释研究”(项目批准号:22VRC022)阶段性成果
贵州大学“中国共产党‘心学’与推进党的建设新的伟大工程高端智库”支持。
关键词
舍勒
利普斯
代入感
陌己认识
唯我论
Scheler
Lipps
empathy
the knowledge of others
solipsism
