摘要
维特根斯坦的“面相观看”不仅是对“知觉经验”议题的讨论,更是一种元哲学层面的方法论。倡导哲学家致力于概念革新的“概念工程”是当代最炙手可热的哲学方法论议题。但有种观点提出维特根斯坦的面相观看是一种不同于概念工程的方法论。这个观点是站不住脚的。实际上,面相观看可以是概念工程的一种形式或一个环节,捍卫这个主张要具体回应三种可能的挑战:其一,面相观看作为一种知觉经验无法概念化;其二,概念工程预设了概念的单一性,而这无法覆盖语词在生活世界的多样性;其三,面相观看是治愈的,这与概念工程的积极建构是不融贯的。
Wittgenstein’s investigation of aspect seeing encompasses not only perceptual experience but also a philosophical method.Conceptual engineering has emerged as a prominent method in contemporary philosophical discourse.Some philosophers argue that aspect-seeing represents a distinctive method that should not be classified as conceptual engineering.Contrary to this view,this paper asserts that aspect-seeing constitutes a form of conceptual engineering or is a part of conceptual engineering.However,three challenges need to be addressed:(1)The conceptualization of perceptual experience;(2)The tension between the generality of concepts and the context-sensitivity of words;(3)The therapeutic nature of aspect-seeing compared to the constructive nature of conceptual engineering.
出处
《哲学分析》
北大核心
2024年第1期32-47,196,共17页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“概念的规范性问题研究”(项目编号:23BZX071)阶段性成果。
关键词
维特根斯坦
面相观看
概念工程
概念
知觉
Wittgenstein
aspect seeing
conceptual engineering
concept
perception
