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博弈视角下分类回收对废旧产品回收影响研究 被引量:4

Study on the Impact of Classified Recycling on the Recycling of Waste Products from The Perspective of Game Theory
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摘要 在废旧产品回收过程中,对其分类可以有效提高废旧产品处理效率。为分析分类回收对废旧产品回收处理的影响,分别基于无分类回收、处理商负责分类回收、回收商负责分类回收和集中决策四种情形构建废旧产品回收的博弈模型。基于四种情形下的最优解,首先,确立处理商和回收商愿意负责分类回收的边界条件;其次,对比分析不同情形下分类回收对废旧产品单位委托回收价格、单位回收价格、回收数量和收益的影响;最后,基于分散决策与集中决策对收益的影响,运用成本分摊-收益共享契约给出分散决策时的协调机制,使分散决策时达到整体最优。研究主要得到:在处理商和回收商愿意进行分类回收的边界内,回收商进行分类回收不仅能够降低处理商的回收成本,还可以同时增加处理商和回收商收益;集中决策时,进行分类回收可以提高回收渠道整体收益;分散决策时,可以通过成本分摊-收益共享契约使分散决策时收益达到集中决策的效果。 In the recycling of waste products,their sorting can effectively improve the processing efficiency of waste products.To analyse the impact of sorting on waste product recycling,a game model for waste product recycling is established based on four scenarios:no sorting,processors responsible for sorting,recyclers responsible for sorting,and centralised decision making.Based on the optimal solutions in the four scenarios,first,the boundary conditions under which processors and recyclers are willing to take responsibility for classified recycling are identified;second,the impact of classified recycling on the per-unit commission price,per-unit recycling price,recycling volume,and waste product revenue in the different scenarios is compared and analysed;finally,based on the revenue impact of decentralised and centralised decision making,a cost-benefit sharing contract is used to provide a coordination mechanism for decentralised decision making.It is found that within the limits where processors and recyclers are willing to sort,sorting can not only reduce the cost of recycling for processors,but also increase the revenue of both processors and recyclers;in the case of centralised decision making,segregated recycling can increase the total revenue of the recycling channel;in the case of decentralised decision making,the benefits of decentralised decision making can be achieved through a cost-benefit sharing contract to achieve the benefits of centralised decision making.
作者 李飚 夏西强 赵强 LI Biao;XIA Xi-qiang;ZHAO Qiang(School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;Hust School of economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2023年第8期261-268,共8页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(21YJC630140) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71702174) 河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2022BJJ094)。
关键词 分类回收 处理商 回收商 博弈论 classified recycling processor recycler game theory
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