摘要
财政转移支付对地方政府债务规模的影响,不仅仅是一个公共财政或金融信贷问题,更是一个与我国基本治理结构紧密相关的政治经济学问题。论文以项目制治理为理论导向对此问题展开了实证研究。研究认为,在此治理模式下,基层地方政府可以将省以下的转移支付作为项目运作的资源配置杠杆,申请更多的信贷资金支持,从而推高其地方政府债务。利用对四川省2016-2019年县级面板数据的实证分析,论文揭示了二者之间的因果关联:基层转移支付收入在整体上会扩张地方政府债务规模,并加重其债务成本;这一扩张效应更多是由专项转移支付带来的,而一般转移支付则与债务付息支出更为相关。该发现说明,我国基层转移支付的预算软约束问题已经深深嵌入到更为宏观的政治激励与经济建设模式之中,从而也需要从完善官员治理、优化政府间财政关系以及加强各种财政资源有效配置等方面加以改善。
The impact of fiscal transfers on local government debt in China is not only a significant concern in public finance and financial credit,but also a crucial issue intimately connected to the nation's fundamental governance structure.Drawing from the theoretical perspective of the Project System,we propose that local governments are highly likely to utilize fiscal transfers as financial leverage to secure additional support from credit funding sources,consequently increasing their local government debt.By analyzing county-level panel data from Sichuan Province,this study discovered that the aggregate revenue from local transfer payments contributes to the expansion of local government debt.This expansionary effect predominantly stems from special transfer payments,while general transfer payments exhibit a stronger correlation with debt interest payments,thereby validating our hypotheses.Our findings reveal that the soft budget constraints of local fiscal transfers are deeply ingrained within the macro-level models of political incentives and economic development.As a result,it is imperative to strengthen official governance,optimize intergovernmental fiscal relations,and promote more effective distribution of diverse financial resources.
作者
游宇
张光
Yu You;Guang Zhang
出处
《公共行政评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第3期142-160,199,共20页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
福建省社科研究基地国家治理能力建设研究中心重大项目“基层社会治理创新的路径研究”(FJ2021MJDZ002)。
关键词
财政转移支付
地方政府债务
政府间财政关系
软预算约束
Fiscal Transfer
Local Government Debt
Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations
Soft Budget Constraint
