摘要
分税制改革后,中央政府越来越注重通过项目发包和专项补助的形式强化对地方政府的激励,逐步形成了一种新型央地关系治理模式-项目制。文章通过构建反映央地关系的动态博弈模型,分析了项目制对地方政府融资决策的影响,进而基于278个地级市政府获得的专项补助和债务数据,对项目制的债务扩张效应及其中介机制进行了实证检验。结论表明:项目制显著促进了地方政府债务的扩张,这种效应一方面来自于项目制对地方政府公共投资的激励,另一方面来自于专项补助导致的预算软约束,其进一步诱发了地方政府在债务融资行为上的道德风险。而且以上效应在财力基础较弱地区表现得更显著。这意味着财政体制现代化不仅应构建规范透明的项目申请审批制度,还应提高地方政府的预算硬约束。
With the completion of tax-sharing system reform in 1994, the financial capacity and governance capacity of the central government have been rapidly improved. In order to encourage the local government to actively achieve the goal of ＂promoting economical growth and maintaining people＇s livelihood＂,after 2002, the central government gradually came to allocate the transfer payment in the form of ＂projects＂downward. The special transfer payment allocated by the project application increased rapidly from 37.5 billion yuan in 1995 to 1894.1 billion yuan in 2014, with an average annual growth rate of 22.93%. The huge amount of the special transfer payment has strengthened the governing effect of the central government in relying on the top-down system and gradually formed a unique governance model of ＂project institutions＂. Project institutions establish the hierarchical governance mechanism between the central and local governments, which not only fully arouses the enthusiasm of local governments to carry out the campaign of project competition and develop regional economy, but also increases the debt financing needs of local governments. Actually,project institutions form a financial capital chain with the project as the carrier, the central special transfer as the guide, and the local supporting funds, bank loans and other funds extensively involved. By constructing the dynamic game model which reflects the relationship between central and local governments, we analyze the impact of project institutions on financing decisions of local governments. Then based on the special subsidy and local debt data of 278 cities, we test the expansion effect on the debt of project institutions and the mechanism. The research shows that project institutions significantly promote the expansion of local debts. The effect, on the one hand, comes from the increase of debt financing of public investment demands; on the other hand, comes from soft budget constraints of the special subsidy, which may induce local government
作者
冀云阳
付文林
Ji Yunyang;Fu Wenlin(School of Public Economics and Administration,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期38-52,共15页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(16ZDA065)
关键词
项目制
地方政府债务
专项补助
预算软约束
project institutions
local government debts
special transfer
soft budget constraints
