摘要
为解决建筑施工过程中的环境污染问题,从污染防治参与方的角度,利用演化博弈理论构建政府、施工企业、社会公众多层次模型,对其进行动态稳定性分析,得到不同条件下各方倾向做出的决策组合,并运用MATLAB对各均衡点进行仿真分析。结果表明,政府策略与其净收益、施工企业和社会公众的行为均有关系,施工企业和社会公众是否选择积极防治污染主要取决于自身的净收益。
In order to solve the environmental pollution problem in the construction process,a multi-level model of government,construction enterprises and the public is constructed from the perspective of the participants in pollution prevention and control using evolutionary game theory,which is analyzed for dynamic stability to obtain the combination of decisions that each party tends to make under different conditions,and MATLAB is used to simulate and analyze each equilibrium point.The results show that the government strategy is related to its net income,the behavior of construction enterprises and the public,and whether construction enterprises and the public choose to actively prevent pollution mainly depends on their own net income.
作者
吴嘉梁
戴明慧
任金哥
Wu Jialiang;Dai Minghui;Ren Jinge(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,China)
出处
《山西建筑》
2023年第6期170-172,184,共4页
Shanxi Architecture
关键词
建筑施工
污染防治
演化博弈
仿真分析
building construction
pollution prevention
evolutionary game
simulation analysis
