摘要
反垄断刑事责任制度的落地需要立法者将垄断行为犯罪化,但传统的社会危害性原则、危害原则和法益保护说三种犯罪化依据无法为垄断行为入罪提供理论支撑。垄断行为入罪的域外经验表明,公众态度影响反垄断规制的模式与进程。现有垄断行为法律责任的威慑力不足,刑法作为“后矛盾法”理应退居民事与行政责任干预之后。故而,构建以“公众态度”为入罪起点、“最后威慑”为刑事责任定位的犯罪化路径,是垄断行为入罪的正当理据。垄断行为犯罪化的关键是厘清刑法与反垄断法的边界,由此刑事责任的辐射范围应限定于核心卡特尔。基于市场的自我调整功能和刑法控制的负面效应,二元化犯罪模式可以考虑作为垄断罪的构建范式。
The implementation of the anti-monopoly criminal liability system requires legislators to criminalize monopoly behaviors,but the theory of social detriment,harm principle and legal interest protection theory cannot provide theoretical support for the criminalization of monopoly behavior.The extraterritorial experience of criminalizing monopoly behavior shows that public attitudes affect the mode and process of monopoly regulation.The deterrent force of the existing legal liability for monopoly behavior is insuffi cient,and the criminal law,as a“post-contradiction law”,should be retired after the intervention of civil affairs and administrative liability.Therefore,constructing a criminalization path with“public attitude”as the starting poi nt and“final deterrence”as the orientation of criminal responsibility is a legitimate reason for the criminalization of monopoly behavior.The key to criminalize monopoly behavior is to clarify the boundary between criminal law and anti-monopoly law,so the radiation scope of criminal responsibility should be limited to core cartels.Based on the self-adjustment function of the market and the negative effects of criminal law control,the dualistic crime model can be considered as the construction paradigm of monopoly crime.
作者
刘乃梁
叶鑫
Liu Nailiang;She Xin
出处
《竞争政策研究》
CSSCI
2023年第1期43-53,共11页
Competition Policy Research
基金
国家社科基金青年项目“系统性风险防范下金融科技反垄断规制研究”(21CFX082)阶段性研究成果。
关键词
垄断行为
刑事责任
犯罪化根据
Monopolistic Behavior
Criminal Responsibility
Criminalization Rationale
