摘要
中央政府纠正地方执行偏差的效果为何会出现差异?既有研究基于激励工具和非常规治理模型下的控制工具,形成了较为系统的解释理论,而在常规治理模式中的控制工具研究虽成果丰硕,但缺少实证检验和统一的解释框架。基于清理整顿违规开发区的政策实践,采用定量与定性混合的研究方法,论文发现,在中央政策目标与地方整体目标不完全一致的情境下,权威地位、时间压力和信息占有均构成有效的控制工具。中央政府对控制工具的不同使用策略造成纠偏效果的差异。当中央政策发布机构权威地位相对较低,时间压力相对较小,且未进行实地督查时,中央政府纠偏效果相对不彰。随着三种控制工具的使用与叠加,地方对中央政策的重视程度显著提升,纠偏效果持续改善。同时,控制工具的局限性导致其作用持续性存疑。研究试图基于中国科层组织常规治理模式,发现中央政府控制策略的新研究视角。
Why is there a difference in the effectiveness of the central government in correcting local implementation deviations?Although the literature discusses systematic explanatory theories based on incentive tools and control tools under unconventional governance models,they lack empirical testing and a unified interpretation framework.Based on an empirical study of the policy of cleaning up and rectifying illegal development zones,this paper finds that authority,time pressure,and information possession constitute effective control tools when the central policy objectives and the overall local goals are not completely consistent.The use of different strategies also causes variations in the corrective effects.When the central agency lacks authority,the time pressure is relatively small,and supervision is not a factor,then the central corrective effect is ineffective.With the use and superposition of the three control tools,however,the local government will attach significant importance to the central policy,while the central correction effect continues to improve.But these control tools are limited,calling into question their sustainability.This study uses a new research perspective on central control strategies to better explain the conventional governance model of Chinese bureaucratic organizations.
出处
《公共行政评论》
北大核心
2023年第1期125-143,199,共20页
Journal of Public Administration
基金
国家社科基金重大项目:健全充分发挥中央和地方两个积极性体制优势的实现机制研究(20ZDA042)。
关键词
控制
权威
时间压力
信息占有
开发区政策
Control
Authority
Time Pressure
Information Possession
Development Zone Policy
