摘要
以2010—2019年A股上市公司为样本,考察CEO自由裁量权对企业避税行为的影响,并在此基础上探讨CEO能力对二者关系的调节作用.结果显示:CEO自由裁量权与企业避税程度呈“U”形关系,存在CEO自由裁量权对企业避税程度影响的临界值.即在自由裁量权不超过临界值的情况下,企业避税程度随着CEO自由裁量权的增大而下降,超过临界值后,CEO自由裁量权反而会加剧企业避税程度;与CEO能力低的企业相比,CEO能力高的企业中CEO自由裁量权与企业避税行为的“U”形关系更加显著,说明CEO能力本身并没有好坏之分,其却能够强化CEO的“管家”角色与“代理人”角色,对企业避税行为有完全不同的影响.本文的研究意在拓宽企业避税行为影响因素以及CEO自由裁量权经济后果的相关研究范围,同时为税收监管部门的工作提供新的监管方向.
Taking companies listed on A-share market from 2010 to 2019 as samples,the impact of CEO’s discretion on corporate tax avoidance was examined in this paper;on this basis,the ability of CEO in regulating the relationship between the two parties was discussed.The results show that there is a‘U’-shape relationship between CEO discretion and enterprise tax avoidance,that is to say,there exists a critical value of the impact of CEO discretion on enterprise tax avoidance.In other words,when the discretion does not exceed the critical value,the degree of corporate tax avoidance decreases with the increase of CEO discretion.While exceeding the critical value,CEO discretion will aggravate the degree of corporate tax avoidance.Compared with the enterprises with low CEO ability,the enterprises with high CEO ability have a more significant‘U’-shape relationship between CEO discretion and enterprise tax avoidance,indicating that there is no difference of good or bad for CEO ability itself,but it can strengthen the role of‘housekeeper’and‘agent’of CEO,with a totally different impact on enterprise tax avoidance behavior.The research perspective in this paper broadens the relevant studies on the influencing factors of corporate tax avoidance and the economic consequences of CEO discretion,thus providing a new regulatory direction for tax regulators at the same time.
作者
胡素华
汪钰菲
HU Suhua;WANG Yufei(Business School,Shaoxing University,Shaoxing,Zhejiang 312000)
出处
《绍兴文理学院学报》
2022年第8期98-105,共8页
Journal of Shaoxing University
