摘要
本文以2009—2013年A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了CEO权力对公司避税强度的影响,以及客户集中度对二者关系的调节作用。研究结果显示,CEO权力显著提高了公司的避税强度,但随着客户集中度的提高,CEO权力与公司避税强度之间的正向关系减弱,表明作为企业外部利益相关者的客户能够发挥一定的治理作用。在进一步引入外部环境因素(法律和信任)后发现,高质量的法律和信任环境都能够削弱CEO权力和公司避税强度之间的关系,并且客户集中度所发挥的制约作用也会受到不同环境质量差异的影响。本文的研究丰富了CEO权力经济后果的研究经验,同时将外部大环境与公司内部治理相结合,对解决公司内部治理问题有重要的参考意义。
By taking A-share listed manufacturing companies from 2009 to 2013as the research sample,this paper empirically tests the impact of CEO power coverage on the the intensity of corporate tax avoidance,as well as the moderating effect of customer concentration between CEO power and the intensity of corporate tax avoidance.The results show that CEO power can significantly improve the strength of company tax avoidance,but with the improvement of customer concentration,the positive relation between CEO power and corporate tax avoidance intensity decrease,which indicates that customers who are company's external stakeholders can play a certain role in governance.After the further introduction of external environmental factors(Law and trust),we find that high quality of law environment and trust environment can weaken the relationship between CEO power and corporate tax avoidance intensity,and the different quality of environment also can affect the customer concentration's effect which play a restrictive role in CEO power.This study enriches the research experience of CEO power's economic consequences,and the combination of external environment and internal governance has important reference significance to solve the problem of internal governance.
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第9期100-113,共14页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
安徽省教育厅人文社科重大项目(SK2014ZD008)
安徽大学研究生学术创新研究项目(yfc100271)
关键词
CEO权力
公司避税
客户集中度
法律环境
信任环境
CEO power
corporate tax avoidance
customer concentration
law environment
trust environment
