摘要
数字经济时代消费者个人信息保护正在引起各界的关注,尤其是不同个人信息保护水平下的当事人策略、社会福利分布等问题值得进一步探讨。在实验市场中,消费者个人信息保护分为外生设置和自主选择设置,其中,外生设置下厂商直接获得或完全不能获得消费者个人信息,自主选择设置下消费者自己决定个人信息保护的程度。针对不同的设置,厂商决定广告真实性并进行推荐。若消费者个人信息得到保护,则厂商不了解消费者个人信息,厂商可能更多选择真实广告,消费者的最优策略是根据厂商广告选择是否购买。若消费者个人信息得不到保护,只有足够厌恶说谎的厂商才会做真实广告,消费者的福利由于不能分离自利厂商和有说谎成本的厂商而受损。因此,个人信息保护有利于消费者,考虑到个人信息保护成本,消费者一般会选择适当的个人信息保护水平。当厂商进行推荐时,由于推荐需要精确的个人信息并对消费者有利,消费者会降低个人信息保护水平并减少购买,但接受符合自身偏好的推荐。本文认为,未来应推动分类型的个人信息保护,加大对虚假广告和泄露个人信息的打击力度,降低消费者自主保护个人信息的成本。
In digital era consumers’ personal information protection is attracting much attention, meanwhile, many topics such as the strategies of many agents as well as the social welfare distribution under alternative personal information protection levels are still worth further study. In the experimental market, consumer personal information protection is divided into exogenous settings and self-selection settings. Under the exogenous setting, firms directly can or cannot obtain consumers’ personal information at all. Under the self-selection setting, consumers decide the degree of personal information protection. The firm could decide the truthfulness level of its advertisement and also make recommendation to consumers in distinctive settings. If the consumer’s personal information is protected, then the firm can’t know the consumer’s personal information and it will report its characters honestly most of the time. The consumer’s optimal strategy would be making purchase decision based on the firm’s advertisement.If the consumer’s personal information isn’t protected, then only the firms which averse lying to a high enough extent will send truthful advertisement, thus the consumers can’t tell out the honest firm and selfish firm and will be deceived. The consumer’s welfare will suffer loss. Therefore, personal information protection benefits consumers and then the consumers are willing to pay appropriate cost to protect their personal information after concerning the cost of personal information protection. When the firms could make recommendations, because the recommendation may need more precise personal information and could benefit consumers, the consumers will lower the personal information protection level as well as their demand, but accept the recommendations which are in consistent with their preference. Therefore, in the future the type-relied personal information protection should be conducted, the fake advertisement and leakage of personal information should be sanctioned more severel
作者
汪敏达
李建标
陈志斌
WANG Min-da;LI Jian-biao;CHEN Zhi-bin(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China;School of Economics and Institution of Brain-Like Economics,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China;China Academy of Corporate Governance and Binhai College,Nankai University,Tianjin 300270,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期156-173,共18页
China Industrial Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“重大公共卫生危机中的行踪报告与主动检测行为研究——基于信息回避的视角”(批准号21YJA630084)
国家社会科学基金重大项目“平台企业社会责任治理机制研究”(批准号19ZDA097)
国家社会科学基金重点项目“国有和非国有资本在战略前瞻性行业的竞合边界及其经济治理机制研究”(批准号20AZD044)。
关键词
个人信息保护
广告
社会福利
说谎心理成本
实验研究
personal information protection
advertisement
social welfare
psychological lying cost
experimental study
