摘要
本文在存在网络效应和转移成本的市场条件下,构建两期动态博弈模型研究厂商根据消费者的购买历史进行竞争性歧视定价的商业行为。研究结果表明转移成本是厂商可以实施价格歧视的内在原因;在歧视定价均衡中,厂商在第二期会通过给予价格优惠吸引竞争对手的消费者转移,并在第一期为争取市场份额而进行激烈的竞争,网络效应加剧了企业两期的价格竞争。就市场绩效而言,网络效应会导致消费者剩余和社会福利的提高、厂商利润的下降;而转移成本对于社会福利的影响则是负面的。此外和统一定价相比,歧视定价降低社会总福利。因此以社会总福利为目标的公共政策,应着重于降低转移成本,并限制厂商使用歧视定价的营销策略。
In this paper, we develop a two-stage game model to study the business practice of price discrimination by consumers＇ purchased-history in a duopoly market. We show that switching cost is the main reason for price discrimination. In the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the two staged competition, we find that firms will induce rivals＇ consumers to switch by offering price discount in the second period, and compete fiercely in the first period in order to capture higher market shares, network effects will result in strong competition between the two finns in two periods. Warfare analysis shows that an increase in network effects leads to lower profits and higher consumer surplus as well as higher social welfare, while the presence of switching costs reduces social welfare. Comparing with uniform pricing, discriminatory pricing by consumers＇ purchasing history will decrease social welfare. Therefore, public policy should aim at reducing switching cost, need not be concerned with network effects, and should restrict competing finns from using the business strategy of price discrimination.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第9期55-66,共12页
Economic Research Journal
基金
教育部人文社会科学"信息产品的定价和策略性行为分析及政府规制"(06JA790071)
上海市社科规划(01FJB002)
上海市教委青年基金(01QN50)
上海市"曙光计划"资助项目成果
关键词
网络效应
转移成本
消费者购买历史
价格歧视
统一定价
Network Effect
Switching Cost
Consumers＇ Purchased-history
Price Discrimination
Uniform Pricing
