摘要
在授权制造下,为分析碳交易对制造/再制造供应链影响和研究供应链协调机制,基于授权制造分别构建由一个原始制造商和一个再制造商参与的分散决策博弈模型和集中决策博弈模型,对比分析政府碳交易政策对两种决策模式最优解影响,并针对制造商分散决策导致的边际损失问题,给出固定授权费的协调机制。研究主要得到:无论分散决策还是集中决策,当碳交易价格大于某一阈值时,碳交易不仅可以降低两种产品对环境的影响,还增加消费者剩余;分散决策时,在碳交易下原始制造商可以通过降低单位授权再制造费用来增加利润;原始制造商和再制造商可以签订固定授权费的契约来协调供应链利润。
In order to analyze the impact of carbon trading on manufacturing/remanufacturing and the coordination mechanism of supply chain based on authorization manufacturing,the game models involving an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)and a remanufacturer are respectively constructed for decentralized and centralized decision-making.Based on the optimal solution of decentralized and centralized decision-making model,the effects of carbon trading on the optimal solution of the two decision-making modes are compared and analyzed,and the coordination mechanism of fixed authorization fee is given to solve the problem of marginal profit loss of supply chain caused by decentralized decision-making.The main research results are as follows:when the carbon trading price is greater than a certain threshold,carbon trading can not only reduce the environmental impact of the two products,but also increase the consumer surplus,whether it is the decentralized decision or centralized decision;when making decentralized decision,the OEM can increase its profit through reducing authorization fee based on the carbon trading;the OEM and the remanufacturer can sign a contract with fixed authorization fee to coordinate supply chain profit.
作者
夏西强
路梦圆
徐春秋
XIA Xi-qiang;LU Meng-yuan;XU Chun-qiu(Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China;School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第5期136-142,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71702174,71702712)
教育部人文社科项目(21YJC630140,17YJC630183)
河南省高校科技创新人才项目(21-CX-007)。
关键词
碳交易
授权再制造
协调机制
博弈论
carbon trading
authorization remanufacturing
coordination
game theory