摘要
现象与物自体之分是康德先验观念论的核心论题,但迄今争议不断。通行的“两个世界”与“一个世界”的解读,都以先验哲学在形而上学或本体论上的预设为前提,从而把物自体视为某种形而上学的对象或者与现象同一的对象。但康德频繁地强调先验哲学与形而上学不同,先验哲学根本不包含任何本体论的承诺,即它并不预设任何种类的对象之实存。因此,“一个世界”与“两个世界”的争议只是一种“家族争吵”,这种争议本身也受到了学界的批评。而谢林对物自体概念的批评以及康德在《遗著》中的反思都表明,对物自体概念的非对象视角的解读更加可取,并且这种解读在《纯粹理性批判》中也有着明确的文本依据。
The distinction between appearance and things in themselves is the central thesis of Kant’s transcendental idealism,which is controversial up to now.The current interpretations of two-worlds and one-world,both of which presuppose that transcendental philosophy includes metaphysical or ontological precondition,thus take things in themselves as some metaphysical object or some object that is identical with appearance.But Kant emphasizes that transcendental philosophy is different from metaphysics,and the former doesn’t include any ontological commitment at all,which means that transcendental philosophy doesn’t assume the existence of any kind of object.Thus,the controversy of two-worlds and one-world is only“family disputes”,and the controversy is criticized.Both Schelling’s criticism and Kant’s reflection in Opus Postumum about the concept of things in themselves indicate that the interpretation from the view of non-object is more advisable,which also has explicit textual evidence in Critique of Pure Reason.
作者
陈永庆
Chen Yongqing(School of Political Science and Public Administration,Henan Normal University,Xinxiang,453007)
出处
《哲学评论》
2021年第1期144-163,共20页
Wuda Philosophical Review
关键词
现象
物自体
思想物
先验哲学
形而上学
appearance
things in themselves
thought-entity
transcendental philosophy
metaphysics
