摘要
缺陷产品造成安全事故频发对消费者人身和财产安全造成严重影响。本文针对产品召回的监管问题,考虑参与各方主体利益最大化,构建政府监管部门、企业和消费者三方博弈策略收益矩阵,对比分析各博弈主体行为策略的演化稳定均衡,分析三方博弈主体策略选择的影响因素,找出破解当前召回监管模式弊端的突破口。研究表明:对于政府,提高政府行政处罚力度、优化政府监督流程,将提高政府召回监督工作效率;对于企业,设立缺陷召回信用机制、提高对消费者损失的赔偿,将提高企业积极配合、主动召回的积极性;对于消费者,搭建缺陷召回信息平台、降低消费者维权成本和提高维权所得的赔偿,将有助于消费者主动上报缺陷产品信息、积极参与缺陷产品召回工作。
Frequent safety accidents caused by defective products have a serious impact on consumers’personal and property safety.Focusing on regulatory issues for product recalls,the paper considers to maximize the interests of the participating parties,and builds the game strategy gains matrix of three parties—government regulators,companies and consumers.It then analyzes the evolution of the strategies of the three parties,and the influence factors of their strategies to find solutions for removing the disadvantages of the current recall regulatory model.The research shows that:for government,increasing the level of administrative penalty,reducing the cost of recall supervision and optimizing the process of government supervision will improve the efficiency of government recall supervision.For enterprises,establishing the defect recall credit mechanism and improving the compensation for consumers’losses will enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises to actively cooperate with government to recall products.For consumers,establishing a defect recall information platform,reducing consumer rights protection costs and improving compensation for rights protection will help them to actively report the information of defective products and participate in the recall of defective products.
作者
黄佳
钱存华
张天龙
HUANG Jia;QIAN Cun-hua;ZHANG Tian-long(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Tech University;Jiangsu Institute of Quality and Standardization)
出处
《标准科学》
2022年第1期62-68,79,共8页
Standard Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“基于可靠性分析的企业核心业务恢复能力研究”(项目编号:71371097)
江苏省研究生实践创新计划项目“制造缺陷消费品召回优化”(项目编号:SJCX21_0419)资助。
关键词
缺陷产品
召回监管
三方博弈
动态博弈
defective product
recall supervision
tripartite game
information platform
