摘要
公司的规模化发展带来所有权与控制权分离,导致巨大的代理成本。派生诉讼在诸多控制公司代理成本机制中的功能如何定位,与其他公司治理机制的角色如何平衡协调,是值得研究的问题。公共强制措施由国家公权力机关主导,成本较高、效率较低;市场机制凭借客观的竞争性优势发挥对公司经营者的威慑作用,亦具有局限性;股东会、监事会、独立董事等机构存在信息不对称、"结构性偏见"等问题。当侵害公司利益的主体是作为控制人的经营者或大股东时,公司真实意思被隐藏,唯有引入派生诉讼,才能有效解决公司中的本质利益冲突。但由于派生诉讼与公司资本多数决和商业判断规则的天然冲突,其在控制公司代理成本机制中的角色定位应是补充性的,是公司约束经营管理者的最后一道防线,是安全保障机制而非日常运行机制。派生诉讼的主要功能应是阻遏,体现在对整个社会的代理成本减少和治理结构改善上具有正面效益和重要价值;赔偿则是辅助性功能,在判断案件价值时阻遏标准应受到赔偿标准的限制。
The development of company brings about the separation of ownership and control,which leads to agency cost.It is worth studying the role of derivative litigation in many methods of controlling corporate agency cost.The public enforcement is of high cost and low efficiency.Market monitors directors by its competitive characteristic,but it still has limitations.Due to structural bias and information asymmetry,shareholders’ meeting,the board of supervisors and independent directors do not always meet expectations.When directors or controlling shareholders infringe the interests of company,they will not sue themselves.So derivative litigation is brought by minority shareholders to protect the company.However,due to the natural conflict between derivative litigation and capital majority and business judgment rules,the role of derivative litigation should be complementary.It is not operated daily but to keep security.The main function of derivative litigation should be deterrence.Compensation is a supplementary function,and the standard of deterrence should be limited by the compensation standard when judging the value of the case.
出处
《中国政法大学学报》
CSSCI
2021年第5期167-181,共15页
Journal Of CUPL
基金
北京建筑大学市属高校基本科研项目“创业投资模式与公司法的适应性研究”(编号X18295)的成果。
关键词
派生诉讼
代理成本
治理机制
功能定位
Derivative Litigation
Agency Cost
Governance Mechanism
Function
