摘要
为有效约束矿工违章行为、促进煤矿安全生产,从惩罚机制有无溢出效应的对比视角出发,构建矿工与煤矿企业的演化博弈模型,分析两种惩罚机制下系统的演化稳定策略,并以平顶山市某煤矿的“安全伙伴”制度为例进行算例分析。研究结果从制度层面验证了Bradley Curve存在的合理性,即针对群体互助管理的溢出性惩罚制度优于针对个体独立管理的非溢出性惩罚制度;实施溢出性惩罚制度可以促使矿工由Bradley Curve中的自主管理阶段转向互助管理阶段,从而降低事故伤害的概率。结合示例,该煤矿的最优安全伙伴成员数量为2人。
In order to effectively restrain miners’violation behavior and promote coal mine safety production,this study constructs an evolutionary game model between miners and coal mining enterprises from the perspective of whether the punishment mechanism has spillover effect,and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the system under the two punishment mechanisms.Taking the“safety partner”system of a coal mine in Pingdingshan City as an example,the research results verify the rationality of the existence of Bradley Curve from the institutional perspective,that is the spillover punishment system for group mutual management is better than the non-spillover punishment system for individual independent management.The implementation of spillover punishment system can make the miners change from the independent management stage of Bradley curve to the mutual management stage and thus reduce the probability of accident injury.Combined with the example,the optimal number of safety partner members of the coal mine is 2.
作者
杨雪
田阳
宋爱峰
李浩文
刘银双
YANG Xue;TIAN Yang;SONG Aifeng;LI Haowen;LIU Yinshuang(North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第8期1238-1244,共7页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573086)
河南省高等学校哲学社会科学应用研究资助重大项目(2018-YYZD-10)
华北水利水电大学博士研究生创新基金资助项目。
