摘要
本文以2012-2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验了中注协约谈监管对抑制企业违规产生的溢出效应。实证研究发现:对内部控制存在缺陷的上市公司,中注协约谈监管能够发挥“补台效应”;对内部控制有效的上市公司,中注协约谈监管强度与企业内部控制能够发挥“合奏效应”,最终显著抑制这些企业的违规行为。进一步研究发现,中注协约谈监管的“补台效应”与“合奏效应”在民营企业和市场化进程较低地区更显著。本文揭示了利用内外监督合力来抑制企业违规行为的有效路径,也为改革开放以来人们一直讨论和实践的“协调政府作用和市场作用”做出细化解读和实证支撑。
This paper examines the spillover effect of the CICPA(Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants)’s interview regulation on containing corporate fraud based on the data sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019.The empirical research found that:On the one hand,the CICPA’s interview can play a“Compensation Effect”for listed companies with defects in internal control.On the other hand,the CICPA’s interview and corporate internal control can play a“Lollapalooza Effect”for listed companies with effective internal control.And eventually,the violations of these companies can be significantly contained by CICPA’s interview regulation.Further research found that the“Compensation Effect”and“Lollapalooza Effect”of the CICPA’s interview are more significant among private listed companies and regions of low degree of commercialization process.This result reveals an effective way to use the combined forces of internal and external supervision to contain corporate fraud.It also provides detailed interpretation and empirical support for the“coordinating government role and market role”that people have been discussing and practicing since the reform and opening-up.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期159-173,共15页
Accounting Research
基金
中国会计学会科研课题《国家治理体系中注册会计师监督的顶层设计与工作机制研究》(2020ASC017)的资助
关键词
约谈监管
公司违规
补台效应
合奏效应
Interview Regulation
Corporate Fraud
Compensation Effect
Lollapalooza Effect
