摘要
作为正当防卫的指导原则,"权利无须向不法让步"在任何情况下均应当被遵守。不得防卫说剥夺了防卫人面对不法侵害时的防卫权,社会伦理限制说存在将道德与法律混为一谈的风险,自我答责并非正当防卫的正当化依据,故上述观点均难以成为不得实施极端防卫行为的理由。防卫权是国家合法垄断暴力背景下,赋予公民在紧急状态下侵犯他人以保护自身法益的法定权利,理应符合宪法的基本要求。根据保护义务与比例原则在"防卫人—国家—侵害人"三角关系中结合产生的"禁止过度原则",侵害人在仅侵犯轻微法益时,宪法仍对其生命权具有保护义务,此时防卫人不得实施极端防卫行为的原因并非权利向不法让步,而是防卫权向生命权让步。
As the guiding principle of justifiable defense, "rights do not need to make concessions to illegality" should be observed under any circumstances. The "no defense theory" deprives the defenders of their right to defend when they face unlawful infringements. And the theory of social ethics restriction has the risk of conflating morality with law. Self-accountability is not the justification basis for justifiable defense. Therefore, none of the above viewpoints can be a reason of extreme defense. Against the background of the state’s legal monopoly of violence, the right to defense, as a legal right that enables citizens to infringe upon the rights of others in a state of emergency for the protection of their own legal interests, should conform to the basic requirements of the Constitution. According to the principle of prohibition of excessiveness, resulting from the combination of the obligation of protection and the principle of proportionality in the "defender-state-offender" triangle relationship, when an offender infringes upon only minor legal interests, the constitution still has the obligation to protect his right to life. The defender is not allowed to carry out extreme defensive act against the offender not because a right must give way to illegality, but because the right of defense must give way to the right to life.
出处
《环球法律评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期116-131,共16页
Global Law Review
基金
作者主持的2020年度中国博士后科学基金“刑法违法阻却事由对民法免责事由的影响与渗透研究”(2020M681694)的研究成果
