摘要
政府与社会资本合作(public-private partnership, PPP)项目运营期较长,容易出现监管俘获从而削弱政府监管职能的问题。以政府方劣后为前提,引入独立的第三方监管机构,对水生态PPP项目进行监管,构建博弈模型,从演化博弈的视角分析政府的奖惩策略对博弈双方主体行为的影响。模拟结果显示,监管机构对政府惩罚短期负面影响十分显著,但对长期影响较小;同时,仿真结果发现了政府奖励的范围,也找出了第三方监管机构成本与其监管绩效的关系。
Public private partnership(PPP) projects have a long operation period, which is prone to regulatory capture and weaken the regulatory function of the government. Based on the premise that the government is inferior, an independent third-party supervision agency is introduced to supervise the water ecological PPP project, and a game model is constructed to analyze the impact of the government’s reward and punishment strategies on the behavior of the players from the perspective of evolutionary game. The simulation results show that the short-term negative impact of regulators on government punishment is very significant, but the long-term impact is small. At the same time, the simulation results find the scope of government rewards, and also find out the relationship between the cost of third-party regulators and their regulatory performance.
作者
张亚琼
何楠
杨丝雯
王雷
袁胜楠
ZHANG Yaqiong;HE Nan;YANG Siwen;WANG Lei;YUAN Shengnan(School of Management and Economics,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450045,China;School of Public Administration,North China University of Water Resources and Hydropower,Zhengzhou,450045,China;AVIC Harbin Aircraft Industry Group Co.,Ltd.,Harbin 150060,China)
出处
《水资源保护》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第4期166-172,共7页
Water Resources Protection
基金
河南省高等学校哲学社会科学应用研究重大项目(2017-YYZD-04)。
关键词
水生态
PPP项目
第三方监管
演化博弈
water ecology
PPP project
third-party supervision
evolutionary game theory
