摘要
针对可追溯食品供应链决策问题,建立由政府、一个食品生产商和一个食品零售商组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究食品生产商无利他行为、有被动利他行为、有主动利他行为三种情形下的最优决策结果,并分析食品零售商的成本分担行为、公平偏好以及食品生产商的利他偏好对各主体最优策略及结果的影响。结果表明:食品零售商的成本分担行为对自身和食品供应链不利,对政府有利,但仅在食品生产商主动利他情形下对食品生产商有利。食品生产商被动利他情形下,食品零售商的公平偏好不仅能够使其获得更多的供应链利润,也能够提升供应链整体利润,但不能激励食品生产商增加溯源努力投入,也不能改进消费者剩余和社会福利水平;食品生产商主动利他情形下,食品生产商的利他偏好能够激发自身投入更多的溯源努力,并有效提升消费者剩余和社会福利水平。另外,可追溯食品供应链成员的公平偏好和利他偏好特征能够显著影响政府的补贴决策。
In this paper,a Stackelberg master-slave game model composed of the government,a food producer and a food retailer was established to solve the traceability food supply chain decision problem,and the optimal strategies were studied under three conditions of food producer:non-altruistic behavior,passive altruistic behavior and active altruistic behavior,and the effects of food retailer's cost-sharing behavior,fairness preference and food producer's altruistic preference on the optimal strategies and outcome of each agent were analyzed.The results show that:The cost-sharing behavior of food retailer is not benefit for himself and the food supply chain,and is benefit for the government,but it is only benefit for the food producer when the food producer is actively altruistic.In the case of passive altruism of food producer,the fairness preference of food retailer can not only enable him to obtain more supply chain profits,but also improve the overall profits of the supply chain.However,it cannot motivate food producer to increase traceability efforts,nor can it improve consumer surplus and social welfare level.In the case of active altruism of food producer,the altruistic preference of food producer can motivate himself to invest more traceability efforts,and effectively improve the level of consumer surplus and social welfare.In addition,the characteristics of fairness preference and altruistic preference of food supply chain members can significantly affect the government's subsidy decisions.
作者
林强
秦智聃
傅志妍
LIN Qiang;QIN Zhidan;FU Zhiyan(Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain,Chongqing University of Education,Chongqing 400067,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2021年第6期123-128,共6页
Logistics Sci-Tech
基金
重庆市社会科学规划培育项目(2019PY46)。
关键词
食品供应链
可追溯
政府补贴
利他偏好
公平偏好
food supply chain
traceability
government subsidy
altruistic preference
fairness preference
