摘要
本文利用我国A股非金融类上市公司2009—2017年数据,以“双向进入”和“交叉任职”两个指标衡量党组织参与公司治理的情况,进而检验其对上市公司风险承担的影响。结果表明,“双向进入”和“交叉任职”均会显著抑制企业风险承担,但上述抑制作用仅存在于企业风险承担水平较高之时;当企业风险承担处于较低水平时,党组织治理并不会抑制企业适当提高其风险承担。研究还发现,无论是在国有企业还是非国有企业中,党组织参与治理都对风险承担具有抑制作用,“交叉任职”在非国有企业中的作用甚至强于国有企业。本文提供了政治治理对企业风险承担影响的经验证据,并有助于从风险承担行为的角度进一步理解和认识党组织参与治理的后果。
Using the data of Chinese A-share listed nonfinancial companies from 2009 to 2017,this paper explores the effect of the Communist Party of China(CPC)participating in corporate governance on firms’risk-taking.The CPC’s participation is measured by two variables:PARCG(two-way entry)and PARCR(cross appointment).The result supports our hypothesis:the CPC’s participation is negatively related to a firm’s risk-taking;this effect only exists under a high risk-taking level.Conversely,when corporate risk-taking is at a low level,the CPC’s participation will not inhibit companies from appropriately increasing their risk-taking level.Further tests show that the CPC’s participation has a significant negative effect on both state-owned and non-state-owned corporate risk-taking;the effect of“cross appointment”is even stronger in nonstate-owned companies.This paper provides empirical evidence for the influence of political governance on corporate risk-taking behavior,which helps us understand the consequence of the CPC’s participation in corporate governance from the perspective of corporate risk-taking.
作者
李明辉
程海艳
Li Minghui;Cheng Haiyan(Nanjing University Business School;School of Accounting,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期17-31,共15页
Economic Review
基金
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目“企业党建对上市公司财务、会计行为的影响”(项目批准号:2017ZDIXM069)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“审计师对客户税收激进度的反应”(项目批准号:71602047)的阶段性成果。
关键词
政治治理
风险承担
双向进入
交叉任职
Political Governance
Risk-Taking
Two-Way Entry
Cross Appointment
