摘要
在政策与发展的双重驱动下,混合所有制改革已经成为现阶段我国国企改革的重要内容和关键突破口。本文以A股上市国有企业2004~2015年以股权协议转让形式进行混合所有制改革数据为样本,运用双重差分倾向得分匹配(PSM-DID)的方法考察了混改后的绩效。研究发现:(1)不区分改革方式的情况下,混改对企业绩效的提升作用并不显著。(2)国企仅进行所有权转移以及控制权在国有性质主体间进行转移这两种混改方式会显著抑制企业绩效。(3)只有国企将实际控制权转移给非国有性质主体才能够显著提升企业绩效。进一步研究发现,控制权转移给非国有资本对绩效的改善作用主要源于改革后经理人-股东之间代理问题的改善;改革后仍然存在抑制绩效增长的隧道效应这一公司治理问题;改革后未完全剥离的政策性负担对绩效产生不显著的正向影响。
Under the dual drive of policy and development,the reform of mixed ownership has become an important content and a key breakthrough of the reform of state-owned enterprises at this stage.This paper uses the data of A-share listed state-owned enterprises in 2004-2015 to carry out mixed ownership reform in the form of equity agreement transfer,and uses the double differential propensity score matching(PSM-DID)method to examine the performance of mixed reform.The study found that:(1)Without distinguishing the reform methods,the mixed reform does not have a significant effect on corporate performance.(2)State-owned enterprises only transfer ownership and control rights between state-owned entities,the two mixed reform methods will significantly inhibit corporate performance.(3)Only state-owned enterprises transfer actual control rights to non-state-owned entities can significantly improve corporate performance.Further research found that the performance improvement effect of the transfer of control rights to non-state-owned capital is mainly due to the improvement of the manager-shareholder agency problem after the reform;the tunnel effect that inhibits performance growth still exists after the reform,which is a corporate governance problem;after the reform The policy burden that is not completely stripped off has an insignificant positive impact on performance.
出处
《浙江金融》
2020年第11期14-25,共12页
Zhejiang Finance
基金
2015年浙江省社会科学基金项目(15NDJC152YB)成果
2015年浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY15G030002)成果
2015年教育部人文社会科学项目(15YJA790045)成果。
关键词
混合所有制改革
所有权
控制权
企业绩效
Mixed Ownership Reform
Ownership
Control Right
Economic Performance of Enterprises
