摘要
对于标准必要专利(SEP)权利人违反FRAND原则的行为,相关反垄断法基本分析框架可以分为两个相互关联的步骤:第一步,判断行为是否能够封锁相关市场的竞争对手;第二步,判断在封锁竞争对手后,行为人是否能够提高其在相关市场的产品价格。在通信标准领域,由于标准本身不面临竞争,相关SEP权利人无法损害相关技术许可市场的竞争。只有当SEP权利人是垂直企业时,其可能以违反FRAND原则的方式封锁下游标准产品市场的竞争对手,进而可能对标准产品市场造成反竞争效果。根据SEP权利人在标准产品市场是否具有支配地位,具体的反竞争情形可以分为两类,一类涉及现有市场支配地位的维持或强化,另一类涉及不同市场之间市场势力的传导,两类情形发生的可能性并不相同。
As for the conduct violating the FRAND principle by SEP holder,the relevant anti-monopoly law analysis framework could be divided into two interrelated steps:The first step is to determine whether the conduct can effectively foreclose its competitors in relevant market;the second step is to determine whether the SEP holder can effectively increase the price of its product in the relevant market after its competitor is foreclosed.In the field of communication standards,since the standards themselves do not face competition,the relevant SEP holder cannot harm competition in the relevant SEP technology licensing market.Only when the SEP holder is a vertical undertaking,it may through violation of FRAND principle foreclose competitors in the downstream standard product market,which may lead to anti-competitive effect on the standard product market.According to whether the SEP holder has a dominant position in the standard product market,the specific anti-competition situation can be divided into two categories,one is related to the maintenance or strengthening of the existing dominant market position,the other is related to the leverage of market power between different markets,and the possibility of the two kinds of situations is not the same.
出处
《电子知识产权》
CSSCI
2020年第9期29-41,共13页
Electronics Intellectual Property
