摘要
在消费者具有绿色选择偏好和政府提供绿色补贴情况下考虑农产品绿色度对农业生产经营效益的影响,建立农业生产经营主体分别在非合作、协同合作情形下的农业面源污染治理微分博弈模型,基于哈密顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程(HJB方程)求得博弈均衡解。研究发现:无论是在非合作还是协同合作情形下,消费者的绿色偏好和政府的绿色补贴越高,农业生产经营主体产生的污染量越少、治污努力程度越高;政府补贴激励作用在非合作情形下失效,但在合作情形时效果显著;从非合作情形到合作情形,当政府补贴系数一定时,农业生产经营主体的治污努力及个体收益和总收益、农产品绿色度均实现了帕累托改进。
Under the circumstances that consumers have green preference and the government provides green subsidies,considering the impact of greenness of agricultural products on the profitability of agricultural production and operation,this paper establishes the Differential Game model of agricultural non-point source pollution control in the case of non-cooperation and cooperation of agricultural production and management subjects respectively,and obtains the solution of game equilibrium are based on Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation(HJB equation).It is found that,whether in non-cooperative or cooperative situations,the higher the consumers’green preference and the government’s green subsidies,the lower the amount of pollution generated by agricultural production and management subjects in their operation,and the higher the level of pollution control efforts they make;the government’s subsidy incentives fail in non-cooperative situations,but the effect is significant in the case of cooperation;from the noncooperative situation to the cooperative situation,when the government subsidy coefficient is fixed,the pollution control efforts of the subjects,individual income and total income,the greenness of agricultural products all have achieved Pareto improvement.
作者
王梦丹
杜建国
许玲燕
Wang Mengdan;Du Jianguo;Xu Lingyan(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第16期206-214,共9页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重大专项项目“推进绿色发展的路径选择与保障机制研究”(18VSJ038)
国家自然科学基金项目“集约经营格局下考虑共容利益的小流域农业面源污染协同治理机制研究”(71704066)
江苏省自然科学基金项目“集约经营格局下江苏省小流域农业面源污染演变及协同治理机制研究”(BK20170542)
江苏省教育厅自然科学基金面上项目“集约经营下江苏省小流域农业面源污染协同治理机制研究”(17KJB610003)。
关键词
农业生产经营主体
农产品绿色度
农业面源污染
治污策略
微分博弈
agricultural production and management subjects
agricultural product greenness
agricultural non-point source pollution
pollution control strategy
Differential Game
