摘要
在煤炭产业节能减排的大背景下,研究了在政府环境规制下,由煤矿设备供应商和煤炭企业组成的两级供应链的联合减排和协调问题,分别构建了基于减排成本分担契约和无成本分担下的微分博弈模型,求解并比较两种情形下供应链成员的最优均衡策略。研究发现,供应链成员的减排成本分担可以显著提升减排水平和各自的利润。客户的环保偏好对最优减排量和供应链成员的利润都有正影响,且在成本分担契约下,影响越显著。有成本分担时的最优减排量对政府规制的敏感性也显著高于无成本分担时的减排量。政府规制的敏感性越高,煤炭企业越有意愿分担设备供应企业的减排成本。
Under the background of energy saving and emission reduction of the coal industry,this paper studies the joint emission reduction and coordination problems of a two-level supply chain consisting of equipment supplier and coal mining enterprise under government environment regulation.The contracts with or without emission reduction cost sharing are designed under a differential game model,the optimal equilibrium strategies of supply chain members are obtained and compared.It was found that the cost sharing of emission reduction among members of the supply chain can significantly increase their respective profits and emission reduction levels.The environmental preference of customers had a positive impact on the optimal emission reduction and the profits of the members of the supply chain,and the impact was more significant in the case of cost sharing.The sensitivity of optimal emission reduction with cost sharing to government regulation was also significantly higher than that without cost sharing.The higher the sensitivity of government regulation,the more willing coal mine to share the cost of emission reduction of the equipment supplier.
作者
靳妮倩君
JIN Niqianjun(China Coal Technology and Engineering Group Chongqing Research Institute,Chongqing 400039,China)
出处
《中国矿业》
北大核心
2020年第8期24-30,共7页
China Mining Magazine
关键词
减排
煤炭企业
政府规制
供应链协调
微分博弈
emission reduction
coal enterprise
government regulation
supply chain coordination
differential game
