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奖惩机制对混合回收闭环供应链中制造商合作的影响 被引量:13

Alliance with the retailer or the recycler in the hybrid-recycling closed-loop supply chain under premium and penalty mechanism?
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摘要 存在第三方回收商的闭环供应链中,研究奖惩机制对混合回收闭环供应链中制造商合作策略的影响。分别建立制造商不合作(N),仅与零售商合作(MR),仅与回收商合作(MC)以及与零售商和回收商均合作(MCR)四种合作策略。研究发现:制造商与零售商及回收商均存在合作动机。但是,制造商倾向与零售商还是更倾向与回收商合作则与政府奖惩力度有关。当政府奖惩力度较小时,制造商倾向与零售商合作;当政府奖惩力度较大时,制造商倾向与回收商合作。此外,还进一步分析了政府奖惩机制对不同合作策略下供应链整体利润、消费者剩余以及社会福利的影响。 The environmental and economic benefits of remanufacturing have been widely recognized in literature and practice.Countries including Japan,China and USA have attached great importance to the effective use of resources and promulgated corresponding policies to encourage and even enforce manufacturers to carry out recycling and remanufacturing.Hence,we borrow the premium and penalty mechanism in which the government sets the target recovery rate of used products for the manufacturer from prior literature like Wang and Da(2009),Yi and Liang(2012).More concretely,when the actual recovery rate(from both the manufacturer and the recycler)is higher than the target recovery rate,the government will give the manufacturer a certain amount of premium based on the difference between the actual recovery rate and the target recovery rate;otherwise,the government will give some penalty to the manufacturer.It is common that a typical closed-loop supply chain consists of a manufacturer,a retailer and a recycler,in which the manufacturer sells products to consumers through the retailer,and recycles the used products from consumers via the recycler.To achieve a competitive edge and higher supply chain efficiency,the manufacturer,as a leader in the CLSC,can choose which member to ally with.For example,IBM allies with the recycler to strengthen the recycling of used products,because the manufacturer can internalize the full cost savings by this way;Conversely,BMW allies with the retailer to master market demand to alleviate double marginalization between the manufacturer and the retailer.Traditional wisdom like Nie(2012)and Ma et al.(2016)analyzes whether the manufacturer has an incentive to ally with other members and how these various alliances affect industry profits in the CLSC,and they suggest that the manufacturer prefers to ally with the retailer than the recycler.However,they ignore the fact that in order to raise recovery rate of used products,manufacturers like Dell and HP not only collect used products through third-party
作者 石纯来 舒夕珂 胡培 SHI Chunlai;SHU Xike;HU Pei(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2020年第5期178-189,共12页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71531009,71672153) 四川省软科学研究计划项目(2016ZR0055) 四川循环经济研究中心规划项目(XHJJ-1515) 四川省社会科学重点研究基地四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心课题(DSWL16-6)。
关键词 奖惩机制 混合回收 闭环供应链 合作策略 Premium and penalty mechanism Hybrid recycle Closed-loop supply chain Alliance mode
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